Recently I had an email exchange with a friend of mine concerning the infamous “Fristianity Objection” to the Transcendental Argument for God. In that discussion my friend utilized a version of TAG which I pointed out as being in disagreement with Van Til and Bahnsen’s TAG. When I provided quotes to support my case he forwarded them on to a friend. Unfortunately I have not found the time to respond to that last email nor thought the minor disagreement with a respectable brother in the faith to be worth much more time discussing. Thankfully my schedule is now a bit lighter than it has been as of late.
Today I was directed to this post by Ronald W. Di Giacomo. The name of the person who had written in response to my friend is “Ron”. I do not know Mr. Di Giacomo but have only heard good things about him. Nevertheless I must respectfully express my disagreement with his response to my email which was forwarded to him by my friend.
The following three quotations were provided by me to support my claim that TAG is not a deductive (nor inductive) argument. I will present them in turn and summarize the relevant information from each quotation.
“To us the only thing of great significance in this connection is that it is often found to be more difficult to distinguish our method from the deductive method than from the inductive method. But the favorite charge against us is that we are still bound to the past and are therefore employing the deductive method. Our opponents are thoughtlessly identifying our method with the Greek method of deduction. For this reason it is necessary for us to make the difference between these two methods as clear as we can.” (Van Til, Survey of Christian Epistemology, 9.)
Here Van Til views the claim that the TAG proponent employs a deductive method as a “charge against us”. He further states that the TAG proponents’ “opponents” are thoughtless in “identifying our method with the Greek method of deduction.” Van Til is clearly rejecting the idea that TAG utilizes the deductive method of argumentation. Indeed, Van Til seeks to “make the difference between these two methods as clear as we can.”
“To put it simply, in the case of ‘direct’ arguments (whether rational or empirical), the negation of one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But this is not true of transcendental arguments, and that sets them off from the other kinds of proof or analysis. A transcendental argument begins with any item of experience or belief whatsoever and proceeds, by critical analysis, to ask what conditions (or what other beliefs) would need to be true in order for that original experience or belief to make sense, be meaningful, or be intelligible to us. Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)
In this quote Bahnsen honors his teacher in clarifying at least one major difference between deductive and transcendental method. Notice what Bahnsen explicitly recognizes as setting transcendental arguments “off from the other kinds of proof or analysis.” In a direct argument - be it deductive or inductive - negating a premise results in the negation or unreliability of the conclusion of the argument. In the case of a deductive argument all of the premises must be true in order for the conclusion to be true also. Bahnsen is denying that this is the case with respect to transcendental arguments. Transcendental arguments have this at first intuitively odd feature: “[I]f we should go back and negate the statement of the original belief…the transcendental analysis…would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” An example may be of some benefit here. A deductive argument might proceed as follows:
If logic then God.
Logic.
Therefore God.
However a deductive argument may not proceed as follows:
If logic then God.
Not logic.
Therefore God.
In the second example the “statement of the original belief” (logic in this case) is negated per Bahnsen. Notice that the conclusion no longer follows. However, a transcendental argument may proceed as follows:
Logic presupposes God.
Not logic.
Therefore God.
My example of a transcendental argument falls in line with Bahnsen’s claim that “[I]f we should go back and negate the statement of the original belief…the transcendental analysis…would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion” whereas a deductive argument most certainly does not fall in line with Bahnsen’s claim. Again, TAG is not a deductive argument. Both Van Til and Bahnsen explicitly and repeatedly denied that it is.
“Years ago Van Til realized that opponents of presuppositionalism tend to think that there are only two kinds of reasoning: inductive and deductive. Deductive reasoning stands opposed to inductive. However, there is also transcendental reasoning, in which the preconditions for the intelligibility of what is experienced, asserted, or argued are posed or sought. It, too, stands opposed to a purely inductive approach to knowledge. Critics seem to think that, since presuppositionalism does not endorse pure inductivism, it must favor deductivism instead. This logical fallacy is known as false antithesis.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 176, n. 55.)
Here Bahnsen is found speaking of the “opponents of presuppositionalism.” They are described in terms of their thinking that there are “only two kinds of reasoning: inductive and deductive.” Notice that in the very next sentence Bahnsen actually differentiates transcendental reasoning from these two types of reasoning when he writes, “there is also transcendental reasoning” [emphasis mine]. Notice again that Bahnsen also describes transcendental reasoning as “opposed to a purely inductive approach to knowledge.” Not only does this statement make it clear that transcendental reasoning is not inductive reasoning, but the statement is included in Bahnsen’s discussion of there being a difference between deductive and transcendental reasoning. It may be safely concluded from this that Bahnsen in this context views inductive reasoning as analogous to deductive reasoning which is thus likewise opposed by pure deductivism. Bahnsen even identifies the mistaken assumption that transcendental reasoning must be either deductive or inductive as a fallacy; false antithesis.
Having discussed these texts which come directly from Van Til and Bahnsen I feel quite safe in concluding that TAG - at least according to Van Til and Bahnsen - is neither deductive nor inductive. Indeed I am not sure what else could be concluded from a careful reading of the quotations in question.
Mr. Di Giacomo writes the following in response to the quotations :
The above three quotes were recently forwarded to me for comment, in light of the fact that these sentiments of Van Til and Bahnsen are often (and sadly so) misconstrued as affirmation of their denying the place of deduction and induction in the realm of presuppositional apologetics. (Having the books, I have verified the accuracy of the quotes.)
Note that Mr. Di Giacomo, much to his credit, verified the accuracy of the quotes. There are likely more quotes which were written about the same subject but I see no need to include them in the discussion as the quotations provided will suffice. Unfortunately I do not think that Mr. Di Giacomo has correctly understood the purpose of my providing these quotations in my discussion through email with my friend. If I have “misconstrued” the quotes then Mr. Di Giacomo should point out precisely where I have done so. Further, I did not deny “the place of deduction or induction in the realm of presuppositional apologetics” in my quoting or commenting on Van Til and Bahnsen. I have never denied the place of deductive and inductive reasoning in presuppositional apologetics and have no idea how anyone ever could do so but am open to any examples of someone attempting to do so (it would likely be quite entertaining to say the least!).
In light of the quotations provided I find the following assertion from Mr. Di Giacomo rather confusing:
The beauty of the transcendental argument for the existence of God (TAG) as a special kind of deductive argument is not in the reductio but in the transcendental challenge, which demonstrates that to argue against God one must first presuppose only that which Christianity affords. In other words, TAG is certainly a deductive argument, but it’s a unique kind of deductive argument, not in its form per se but rather in what it seeks to demonstrate.
Contrary Van Til and Bahnsen’s explicit statements that transcendental reasoning is not deductive reasoning Mr. Di Giacomo writes that TAG is “a special kind of deductive argument.” He further writes, “TAG is certainly a deductive argument, but it’s a unique kind of deductive argument [emphasis mine].” The reason I find this exceedingly confusing is that Mr. Di Giacomo is essentially just asserting the exact opposite of what Van Til and Bahnsen have in fact written. There is no exegesis of the passages in question to show that my understanding of them is incorrect and there are no other passages provided to support Mr. Di Giacomo’s view. One might conclude that Mr. Di Giacomo is simply in disagreement with Van Til and Bahnsen on this point and is offering his own view on the matter but then I do not believe this explanation at all fits the context of the discussion. It is apparent that Mr. Di Giacomo is writing his comments concerning Van Til and Bahnsen’s understanding of TAG. Additionally it has been shown above from one of the quotes from Bahnsen that TAG is different from a deductive argument “in its form”.
What Mr. Di Giacomo writes next is worth quoting in its entirety and I am mostly in agreement with him.
Transcendental arguments are concerned with the preconditions of any fact of experience – what must be true in order for any fact of experience to be that which it is. Van Til was careful to note that “the Christian method uses neither the inductive nor the deductive method as understood by the opponents of Christianity, but that it has elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.” (Van Til, page 10 – emphasis mine.) Van Til goes on to critique what he qualified as “exclusively” deductive arguments and “purely” inductive arguments that do not presuppose God. It was the anti-Christian Greek method of logic that Van Til and Bahnsen opposed but not logical apologetics!
Again I think Mr. Di Giacomo misunderstands me as I have no qualms with these insights. Deduction and induction are a part of the presuppositional method of apologetics. Christians certainly use logic and induction but they certainly do not do so or at any rate should not do so in a manner like unto the non-Christian. (I do not mean to imply here that Christian logic and induction differ merely in terms of their use.) There is a difference between deduction and induction from one worldview to another and Van Til is bringing this to light as Mr. Di Giacomo rightly points out. Van Til is nevertheless in this very same passage and context also differentiating transcendental argument from both deduction and induction. On the page Mr. Di Giacomo is quoting from Van Til actually states that combining deduction and induction results in a transcendental method. It is worth noting that Van Til’s claim concerning the combination of deduction and induction in transcendental reasoning appears to exclude Mr. Di Giacomo’s understanding of TAG as a deductive argument. Mr. Di Giacomo continues, “In other words, they never opposed deduction and induction but rather qualified these disciplines in reference to strictly secular uses of reason and inference.” Again I find myself in full agreement with Mr. Di Giacomo here. However, the topic of discussion is not the use of deduction and induction in presuppositionalism but rather the nature of TAG itself. My contention is that TAG is not a deductive argument as my friend presented in his emails. My contention is not that Van Til and Bahnsen taught the denial of “the place of deduction and induction in the realm of presuppositional apologetics.”
Hopefully what Mr. Di Giacomo writes next is a general statement which may or may not apply to me rather than a statement about me in particular. The latter would be extremely presumptuous on the part of Mr. Di Giacomo given that so far as I know he does not have knowledge of what I have and have not read.
Even a careless reading of Van Til and Bahnsen bears this out, but one must first read the authors and not just read about them. And reading the authors would require reading past page 9 in Van Til, at least up through page 10! (Many perceived problems regarding Gordon H. Clark would also vanish if one would only simply go to the original source, rather than choosing sides in a partisan manner.)
For the record I have read both Van Til and Bahnsen and have attempted to do so carefully rather than carelessly. Again, I have read the authors and have not just read about them. My reading also includes material beyond page 9 and 10 of Survey of Christian Epistemology. I have read the book in its entirety. None of this is anything to boast about (although reading Bahnsen’s Analysis in its entirety might be something to be considered worth celebrating). While I am writing ‘tongue-in-cheek’ it is nevertheless true that I have read what I would consider a substantial amount of Van Til and Bahnsen. Hopefully we are thus able to focus upon the arguments which pertain to the disagreement being discussed.
Mr. Di Giacomo writes that, “Bahnsen typically employed modus tollens (MT) in his formal argument, yet he distinguished his employment of TAG from deduction.” The first part of Mr. Di Giacomo’s sentence is another assertion which runs contrary to the quotations and respective commentary provided at the beginning of this response. Mr. Di Giacomo has not provided any reason to read the quotes in question differently from how I have read them. The second part of Mr. Di Giacomo’s sentence results in its being incoherent. Unless Mr. Di Giacomo denies that modus tollens is a deductive argument (which would simply be a false assertion) then there is no way to make sense of the latter part of the sentence wherein it is claimed that Bahnsen “distinguished his employment of TAG from deduction.” If it is granted that Bahnsen was aware that modus tollens is deductive then I see no way to make sense of Mr. Di Giacomo’s sentence. Surely Mr. Di Giacomo understands that Bahnsen “distinguished his employment of TAG from deduction” for why else would he have made this claim? My intent here is not to be disrespectful to Mr. Di Giacomo but rather to make apparent my difficulty making sense of his claims concerning Van Til and Bahnsen’s TAG being a deductive argument. In light of what has been discussed thus far one is at this point at liberty to ask Mr. Di Giacomo to clarify how Bahnsen might have more explicitly or clearly denied that TAG is a deductive argument.
Recall that Mr. Di Giacomo has not explained his reading of the quotes I provided with only one exception which was already discussed. He shifts to writing about Michael Butler’s view of TAG and writes, “Mike Butler (at one time Bahnsen’s assistant) to my knowledge, also, has never pitted transcendental arguments against deduction.” What exactly is Mr. Di Giacomo meaning to imply about my position? I have nowhere stated that transcendental arguments are to be “pitted” against deductive arguments. It may be that Mr. Di Giacomo was not given the context of the email discussion prior to writing his response. Again, my contention is that TAG is not a deductive argument. It is rather a transcendental argument. As already mentioned, deductive arguments and transcendental arguments are relevantly different from one another. Again the quotes from Van Til and Bahnsen reveal that I am in agreement with them concerning this matter.
While Mr. Di Giacomo argues concerning the use of deduction and induction in presuppositionalism for much of his post he does change over to a consideration of whether or not TAG is a deductive argument. For this I am thankful since it is where our disagreement is actually to be found. Unfortunately Van Til and Bahnsen’s views of TAG are not addressed. Rather, Mr. Di Giacomo quotes Butler’s statement of TAG. I do not consider this overly relevant to Van Til or Bahnsen’s view of TAG which is the subject of discussion. Of course Mr. Di Giacomo may appeal to Butler’s position as Bahnsen’s assistant and claim that Butler views TAG the same way that Bahnsen did. I will merely note in passing that if Mr. Butler believes that TAG as Dr. Bahnsen presented it is a deductive argument then he was not listening very carefully to Dr. Bahnsen’s presentation of the argument which I just (oddly enough) studied quite carefully this morning. Butler was not only present for that lecture but was teaching in concert with Bahnsen for the same class.
Mr. Di Giacomo asserts again the very opposite of what Van Til and Bahnsen wrote as quoted at the beginning of this post when he writes, “Van Til and Bahnsen fully appreciated that TAG is a deductive argument strictly speaking (lest they contradicted themselves in practice).” Again I am not persuaded by this claim as it looks to be an assertion made in contradiction to Van Til and Bahnsen without any support.
What Mr. Di Giacomo states next is helpful and so I quote him at length. However, TAG differs from deductive and inductive arguments in more ways than one!
The unique quality of TAG that sets it apart from all other standard deductive arguments is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others – but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience. In other words, with standard deductive arguments we try to deduce from a fact, or series of facts, other facts; no more, no less. If it’s Sunday I’m with a congregation of saints from 9:30-12 in the morning. If I’m not with a congregation of saints at 10:00 a.m., then it’s not Sunday. That it’s not Sunday can be a standard deduction, yet my being with the saints at a certain time does not make Sundays possible. Kant’s genius was that TA’s are concerned with what must be true in order for something else to be possible. God’s revelation makes intelligible experience possible, whereas my being with the saints at a particular time does not make Sunday between 9:30 and noon possible.
Mr. Di Giacomo begins the conclusion of his post by claiming, “Clearly, Bahnsen applied deduction in his demonstration of TAG.” We have seen that Bahnsen denied that this is the case. Mr. Di Giacomo continues, “Accordingly, he was either inconsistent with himself, or we should interpret his statements as meaning something other than TAG is not strictly speaking deductive.” Since the premise which precedes this dilemma is false I am not committed to either of the two options presented. However I will stand firm on what I have written and insist that Mr. Di Giacomo must in accordance with his view imply that Bahnsen was inconsistent with himself.
While Mr. Di Giacomo has very helpfully clarified many misunderstandings of Van Til and Bahnsen’s program I am not persuaded that he has actually dealt with the concerns I have raised regarding the claim that TAG as Van Til and Bahnsen understood it is deductive. I am not denying that both deduction and induction are wholly consistent with the presuppositional method of apologetics. I am commenting concerning Van Til and Bahnsen’s TAG and not Butler’s (I am not meaning to imply that he understands it much differently than they did). Van Til’s comment about combining deduction and induction in the transcendental argument excludes a deductive formalization of TAG. Both Van Til and Bahnsen explicitly and repeatedly deny that TAG is a deductive argument. TAG differs from deductive arguments in more than one way. Bahnsen distinguishes TAG from deductive arguments by virtue of the negation of the antecedent premise in the former form of argument yielding a true conclusion which is impossible in the case of the latter form of argument. There is no readily apparent way in which Bahnsen could have more emphatically and clearly stated that TAG is not a deductive argument. There are many other facts which might be brought to bear upon this discussion. For example, it was Van Til and Bahnsen’s constant claim that TAG yields certainty in its conclusion. Yet in his debate with R.C. Sproul concerning apologetic methodology Bahnsen explicitly denies that deductive arguments provide certainty. Bahnsen’s arguments for this claim focus upon the formal nature of deductive arguments which Mr. Di Giacomo believes TAG shares. It would appear that Bahnsen is either terribly inconsistent at this point or that TAG is not a deductive argument. My hopes are that Mr. Di Giacomo will take all of these points into consideration and I would like to thank him for his work in presuppositional apologetics and sharpening our understanding of TAG. I would also direct him to Don Collett’s article on TAG if he has not already read it as the article has undoubtedly shaped my view concerning these matters.
A very solid rejoinder to a traditional misunderstanding of TAG. Bahnsen died and everyone became a rationalist.
Since TAG, per CVT, “has elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense,” what role do you think there is for elements of induction in a formal TAG?
Posted by ZaoThanatoo | 06. Apr, 2010, 9:34 amThere is no readily apparent way in which Bahnsen could have more emphatically and clearly stated that TAG is not a deductive argument.
So, are you asserting that Bahnsen denied that TAG is an argument that is deductive in form?
Posted by danielj | 07. Apr, 2010, 6:01 pmdanielj,
The meaning of what you quoted from me is that I cannot think of any other way that Bahnsen could have made it more emphatic or clear through his statements that TAG is not a deductive argument. I have provided quotations from both Van Til and Bahnsen wherein they differentiate TAG from deduction. It seems clear to me that Bahnsen thought TAG was not deductive because he repeatedly stated such. What I am being given in response from those who believe TAG is deductive sounds to me something like, “Well, he said it was not deductive, but what he really meant was that it was deductive.”
Here:
1. If TAG is a deductive argument then it does not provide certainty.
2. TAG provides certainty.
3. Therefore TAG is not a deductive argument.
The first premise is supported by Greg Bahnsen’s claim and argument in his debate with R.C. Sproul that deductive arguments do not provide certainty.
The second premise is supported by Greg Bahnsen’s claim and argument in the same debate with R.C. Sproul that TAG provides certainty.
Therefore TAG is not a deductive argument. This is just one way of establishing my point which I mentioned at the end of my response to Mr. Di Giacomo though not in this form.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 08. Apr, 2010, 4:27 amAnd more to the point on what you quoted from me…
I am trying to get at the answer to this question:
If Greg Bahnsen held that TAG is not a deductive argument then how else might he communicate it (assuming that he has not done so even given the evidence I provided)?
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 08. Apr, 2010, 4:30 amWhat part of deductive reasoning is contained in TAG?
Ron is saying it is a special kind of deductive argument and he seems to be attributing the same view to Bahnsen. I’ve not read through Van Til’s Apologetic enough times to comment on Bahnsen’s view with authority. I think I agree with Ron that TAG is a special kind of deductive argument and that TAG contains deduction. I would even feel comfortable describing TAG as deduction where negation of a premise results in the same true conclusion.
If Bahnsen wished to communicate that TAG was not a deductive argument in any way he should have explained how there was no major or minor premises and how the conclusion didn’t necessarily follow from the premises.
Anyway, you and Ron are my go to guys on apologetics so I’m just gonna watch and see if he responds directly to you.
Posted by danielj | 08. Apr, 2010, 7:08 pm“What part of deductive reasoning is contained in TAG?”
I am not sure what you mean by this question, but if it means what I think it means then it does not appear to be relevant to what I am driving at in this particular discussion (though it is a good question for discussion elsewhere). TAG encompasses entire worldviews which include both deductive and inductive reasoning. TAG is however neither exclusively deductive nor inductive. Van Til and Bahnsen say this over and over again and I have provided some examples of their doing so.
“Ron is saying it is a special kind of deductive argument and he seems to be attributing the same view to Bahnsen.”
Yes, I know. Recall what I wrote in my previous comment to you: “What I am being given in response from those who believe TAG is deductive sounds to me something like, ‘Well, he said it was not deductive, but what he really meant was that it was deductive.’” Yet Bahnsen repeatedly denied that TAG is a deductive argument and Bahnsen never said that TAG is a “special kind of deductive argument.” Ron continues to assert his opinion that TAG is a deductive argument without any warrant from Van Til or Bahnsen. Meanwhile I have provided quotes which show Van Til and Bahnsen’s view on the matter. In response Ron has attempted an ad hoc explanation of these quotes in light of the view he holds to on TAG. But how has he established his view of TAG as deductive from Van Til and Bahnsen in the first place?
“I’ve not read through Van Til’s Apologetic enough times to comment on Bahnsen’s view with authority.”
What about the quotes I have provided?
“I think I agree with Ron that TAG is a special kind of deductive argument and that TAG contains deduction.”
In what way does a deductive argument “contain” deduction? This seems redundant. Could you explain to me why you agree with Ron? Where is his evidence that Van Til and Bahnsen held to the position he does? Let us see some texts. I have provided several which show that Van Til and Bahnsen did not believe TAG to be a deductive argument. Ron has not sufficiently dealt with the claims of those quotes. In fact Ron cut the first two lines off of the Bahnsen quote where Bahnsen is differentiating deduction from transcendental argument before trying to explain what Bahnsen meant in accordance with Ron’s assertion that TAG is deductive.
“I would even feel comfortable describing TAG as deduction where negation of a premise results in the same true conclusion.”
Then you may have some misunderstanding about deduction. If you negate the premise of a deductive argument it changes the conclusion. Read the quote from Bahnsen where he says this exact same thing. See my example in the second argument I provided in my original response.
“If Bahnsen wished to communicate that TAG was not a deductive argument in any way he should have explained how there was no major or minor premises and how the conclusion didn’t necessarily follow from the premises.”
All you have done is assumed a definition of deductive argument and then argued that Bahnsen should have explicitly denied each element of that definition. It is not necessary for Bahnsen to have done this because he is assuming that his readers and listeners know what a deductive argument is. In other words; in explicitly denying that TAG is a deductive argument Bahnsen also denies each element of your definition understood in terms of a deductive argument. Further, you are incorrectly assuming that TAG cannot share some features with deductive arguments which is not necessarily the case. For example, both deductive arguments and TAG can have premises. Bahnsen specifically stated some of the differences between deductive and transcendental arguments. One is that negating a premise of a deductive argument changes its conclusion whereas doing the same with a transcendental argument does not. See the quotes I provided! (Note: This is where Ron cut off part of the quote.)
“Anyway, you and Ron are my go to guys on apologetics so I’m just gonna watch and see if he responds directly to you.”
Well Ron is an intelligent man with a lot to offer in terms of apologetics and I too hope that he responds to the problems I have raised with a deductive understanding of TAG in light of Van Til and Bahnsen’s claims.
I noticed that you did not deal with my comment in response to you so I will repeat parts of it here.
I have provided quotations from both Van Til and Bahnsen wherein they differentiate TAG from deduction. It seems clear to me that Bahnsen thought TAG was not deductive because he repeatedly stated such.
Another problem with claiming that TAG is a deductive argument:
1. If TAG is a deductive argument then it does not provide certainty.
2. TAG provides certainty.
3. Therefore TAG is not a deductive argument.
The first premise is supported by Greg Bahnsen’s claim and argument in his debate with R.C. Sproul that deductive arguments do not provide certainty.
The second premise is supported by Greg Bahnsen’s claim and argument in the same debate with R.C. Sproul that TAG provides certainty.
Therefore TAG is not a deductive argument. This is just one way of establishing my point which I mentioned at the end of my response to Mr. Di Giacomo though not in this form.
Read my responses to Mr. Di Giacomo very carefully and closely. See if Mr. Di Giacomo has provided any reason at all to assume that TAG is a deductive argument. He has not quoted Van Til or Bahnsen to this effect, and he has not sufficiently explained the quotations I have provided from Van Til and Bahnsen wherein they explicitly deny that TAG is a deductive argument and even contrast TAG with deductive argument!
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 08. Apr, 2010, 8:48 pmI am not sure what you mean by this question, but if it means what I think it means then it does not appear to be relevant to what I am driving at in this particular discussion (though it is a good question for discussion elsewhere).
Sorry. That was poorly worded and only tangentially related to the topic at hand. You figured it out though.
TAG encompasses entire worldviews which include both deductive and inductive reasoning. TAG is however neither exclusively deductive nor inductive. Van Til and Bahnsen say this over and over again and I have provided some examples of their doing so.
I’m not sure that anybody involved is defining TAG as exclusively deductive although I can only say certainly that I’m not doing so.
What about the quotes I have provided?
I don’t wanna give the wrong impression. I’ve read the book. I’ve also read some Frame. I’m just a layman though. I do start school this year, but I’m not formally schooled yet so I try not to be too loud or dogmatic about anything.
That said, in the first quote, Van Til seems to me to be concerned with distinguishing the Greek method of deduction from the transcendental method. Can you see how that is actually contributing to the confusion? Why doesn’t he just say deduction?
In what way does a deductive argument “contain” deduction?
A special kind of deductive argument. I’m not sayin it is deductive.
Could you explain to me why you agree with Ron? Where is his evidence that Van Til and Bahnsen held to the position he does?
I’m not sure I agree with him about Van Til and Bahnsen. It seems that they did go to great lengths to deny TAG was deductive in any way. I’m saying that TAG appears deductive to me.
Let us see some texts.
I’m reading chapter 5 of Van Til’s Apologetic right now. If I come across anything relevant, I’ll post it.
Then you may have some misunderstanding about deduction. If you negate the premise of a deductive argument it changes the conclusion. Read the quote from Bahnsen where he says this exact same thing. See my example in the second argument I provided in my original response.
What I really don’t understand consistently and thoroughly is transght now, this: Logic presupposes God.
Not logic.
Therefore God. isn’t making sense to me. Anyway, things come and go with me at first. What I do understand is that a negated premise in deduction invalidates the conclusion and that, that does not hold in transcendental arguments. I get that. I just don’t see it as that big of a difference. It is like baseball with eight innings in my book and it is like baseball and cricket in your book.
All you have done is assumed a definition of deductive argument and then argued that Bahnsen should have explicitly denied each element of that definition.
I know. You are the one that asked what I think he should have done. Regardless, all Bahnsen seems to do, from my vantage – regardless of his opinion on the matter, is demonstrate that transcendental argumentation is deduction with the unique feature of leading to a same conclusion even with a negated premise. That is only the way I view it though, even if Bahnsen thinks it is a drastically different from of reasoning. Obviously, the implications are profound, but I still think it is eight inning baseball.
I noticed that you did not deal with my comment
I’m bad at this
1. If TAG is a deductive argument then it does not provide certainty.
2. TAG provides certainty.
3. Therefore TAG is not a deductive argument.
Because I want to get back to my pizza and my book, I’ll let you make up an argument that asserts: TAG is not a type of a deductive argument if it does not contain lots of elements of deduction in the major premise; asserts that TAG does indeed have lots of elements of deduction in the minor premise; asserts that TAG is therefore a type of deductive argument.
All in all, I think you’ve handled yourself in a very graceful and thoughtful manner. Fantastic job.
Posted by danielj | 08. Apr, 2010, 10:01 pmSorry about the mistakes and formatting errors in there. I guess the quote tag is <
Posted by danielj | 08. Apr, 2010, 10:04 pmAGH!
Posted by danielj | 08. Apr, 2010, 10:05 pmCan we not use quote tags in comments? (Feel free to delete the last few comments. I apologize for cluttering up the page!)
Posted by danielj | 08. Apr, 2010, 10:07 pm1. If TAG is a deductive argument then it does not provide certainty.
2. TAG provides certainty.
3. Therefore TAG is not a deductive argument.
Which of the above premises do you believe to be false?
I do not have the time right now to get to your other comments but will try to as soon as I do find the time. You appear to be stating that TAG is both deductive and not deductive though whereas Mr. Di Giacomo has been repeatedly asserting that TAG is deductive. His example of TAG is deductive as well. You may want to read the interaction again.
You may also want to ask yourself why Mr. Di Giacomo has blocked my comments and not linked to the post he is responding to in his comment.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 08. Apr, 2010, 11:26 pmIn context Van Til is distinguishing deduction (and induction) from the transcendental method. He provides Greek deduction as one example of deduction in general. If you read the text prior to the quotation I provided you will see that this is the case. So in answer to your question about why Van Til does not just say “deduction”; he does. Bahnsen does as well.
How can a “special kind of deductive argument” not be a deductive argument? Is it not the case that a “special kind” of car and a car are both cars? So then would not a “special kind” of deductive argument still be a deductive argument? TAG either is a deductive argument or it is not. Mr. Di Giacomo says that TAG is a deductive argument. I say that it is not.
Perhaps you are trying to say that TAG is a special argument in that it uses both deduction and induction. The trouble here is that this does not constitute a particularly “special kind” of deductive argument since many deductive arguments in some sense rely upon induction to inform their premises (e.g. “All men are mortal.”) Further, Mr. Di Giacomo explicitly denies that TAG is an inductive argument or that it uses induction in this manner. His post about this is linked to on the right side of his blog.
You are right that Van Til and Bahnsen did deny that TAG was deductive. You are also right to think that TAG sometimes appears to be deductive. Yet Bahnsen denies that he is utilizing deductive or inductive implication in TAG. What I want to know is why, aside from appearance, people would even think that transcendental argument is deductive to begin with. Forget that we have quotes to the contrary; where are the quotes from Van Til and Bahnsen where they state that TAG is deductive modus tollens? Where are the quotes wherein they state that TAG is deductive, but it is a “special kind” of deduction? I am not the only person with a burden of proof here!
If you get that a negated premise in a deductive argument changes the conclusion while a negated premise in a transcendental argument does not change the conclusion then you are getting it even if you are not sure exactly how that plays out. Frankly, I am not sure how exactly it plays out. What I did provide is Collett’s formalization. WTJ printed the article, followed by Oliphint and now Frame. I am not denying that there are some problems with it and that it is not necessarily Bahnsen’s argument (I am actually playing with the idea that it is not), but it made Frame go back on a view that he has held for his entire life. Something to note here is that Van Til himself never formalized the transcendental argument. If it were as simple as a modus tollens I think he could have handled it! Now back to the first sentence – I am not sure what you mean when you say that you get it but that you do not see it as a big difference. If the premise of an argument can be negated and the conclusion of that argument is thus changed then the argument is not a transcendental argument per Bahnsen. Hence, neither deductive nor inductive arguments are transcendental arguments. Out of curiosity; do you see the differences between deductive and inductive arguments as “big”?
“All in all, I think you’ve handled yourself in a very graceful and thoughtful manner. Fantastic job.”
Please keep Choosing Hats in your prayers especially with respect to the manner in which we handle ourselves whether it be with believers or unbelievers.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 09. Apr, 2010, 1:39 amFirstly, what about the quote tag? Should we just use italics when quoting? I like it better that way if that is the way you prefer it.
… Which of the above premises do you believe to be false?
I could, theoretically, state that premise one is false because TAG is a type of deductive argument that provides certainty, and, since there are other types of deductive arguments that don’t provide certainty, whether or not a deductive argument provides certainty is simply an accidental feature of deductive arguments.
You appear to be stating that TAG is both deductive and not deductive
Well, I would hope that I wouldn’t committing such a flagrant violation of the law of non-contradiction.
though whereas Mr. Di Giacomo has been repeatedly asserting that TAG is deductive. His example of TAG is deductive as well. You may want to read the interaction again.
I’m reading it over and over again trying to figure out exactly what everyone is saying.
You may also want to ask yourself why Mr. Di Giacomo has blocked my comments and not linked to the post he is responding to in his comment.
I have asked myself but I think I’m going to refrain from speculation because I think Ron deserves the benefit of the doubt. Although, I am having trouble understanding his actions.
So in answer to your question about why Van Til does not just say “deduction”; he does. Bahnsen does as well.
Check.
How can a “special kind of deductive argument” not be a deductive argument?
Well, I suppose it isn’t then. I suppose it is as different from deduction as deduction is from induction.
Perhaps you are trying to say that TAG is a special argument in that it uses both deduction and induction. The trouble here is that this does not constitute a particularly “special kind” of deductive argument since many deductive arguments in some sense rely upon induction to inform their premises (e.g. “All men are mortal.”)
What I think I’m saying is: if one takes a deductive argument, makes it certain, provides for a negated premise leading to a same true conclusion and provides for the preconditions of intelligibility then you’ve made the TAG.
Did Kant distinguish transcendental argumentation from deduction?
Further, Mr. Di Giacomo explicitly denies that TAG is an inductive argument or that it uses induction in this manner. His post about this is linked to on the right side of his blog.
Is their induction in your favorite formulation of TAG? I can vaguely recall his post on the subject. I’ll have to read it again.
What I want to know is why, aside from appearance, people would even think that transcendental argument is deductive to begin with.
Well, I told you why I thought so. I’m not sure about others.
then you are getting it even if you are not sure exactly how that plays out.
Yeah, but I need to grasp it fully. I’m trying to utilize it in my witness at work. I’m constantly forced to retreat to Aquinas’ arguments and Platonic stuff to get people thinking about the subject. It works, but I’d prefer to use some kind of TAG in the end. I’ve no interest in turning people into deists.
What I did provide is Collett’s formalization. WTJ printed the article, followed by Oliphint and now Frame.
I can’t find Collett’s article. I found Frame’s concession/response. Do I need to subscribe to the WTJ or something?
Something to note here is that Van Til himself never formalized the transcendental argument.
Noted. I did not know that.
If it were as simple as a modus tollens I think he could have handled it! Now back to the first sentence – I am not sure what you mean when you say that you get it but that you do not see it as a big difference.
I think I’ve made it clear now. If I haven’t it doesn’t matter. I’ll concede now that it isn’t really deductive.
If the premise of an argument can be negated and the conclusion of that argument is thus changed then the argument is not a transcendental argument per Bahnsen.
It certainly seems to be the case that Bahnsen thought that way.
Hence, neither deductive nor inductive arguments are transcendental arguments. Out of curiosity; do you see the differences between deductive and inductive arguments as “big”?
I think I answered that above.
Please keep Choosing Hats in your prayers especially with respect to the manner in which we handle ourselves whether it be with believers or unbelievers.
I will. I’ll do you one better and get it in the prayer calender at the session if I can.
Posted by danielj | 09. Apr, 2010, 6:19 amIs their induction in your favorite formulation of TAG?
“Is there…”
I hate when I do that.
Posted by danielj | 09. Apr, 2010, 6:22 amdanielj: “What I really don’t understand consistently and thoroughly is transght now, this: Logic presupposes God.
Not logic.
Therefore God. isn’t making sense to me. Anyway, things come and go with me at first. What I do understand is that a negated premise in deduction invalidates the conclusion and that, that does not hold in transcendental arguments. I get that. I just don’t see it as that big of a difference.”
clbolt: “If you get that a negated premise in a deductive argument changes the conclusion while a negated premise in a transcendental argument does not change the conclusion then you are getting it even if you are not sure exactly how that plays out. Frankly, I am not sure how exactly it plays out.”
John Frame: “From that conclusion we may further deduce that God is the presupposition of logic in the Strawsonian sense. For if the intelligibility of logic depends on God, then either the affirmation or the (intelligible) denial of the reliability of logic entails God. And (as in Collett’s modus tollens analogue) if God doesn’t exist, then logic is not intelligible; so neither its reliability nor its non-reliability may be affirmed.”
From what I can tell Collett’s TAG is (in part) a formalization of the assertion that the intelligibility of the antecedent in the major premise is based on the (presupposed) consequent, meaning that it (in this case, logic) can not be affirmed or denied without affirming the existence of God first.
Posted by ZaoThanatoo | 09. Apr, 2010, 10:58 pmI don’t ever use HTML in comments but don’t mind if others do.
You could not theoretically state that premise one of the argument is false by claiming that “TAG is a type of deductive argument that provides certainty” because “The first premise is supported by Greg Bahnsen’s claim and argument in his debate with R.C. Sproul that deductive arguments do not provide certainty.” Bahnsen was affirming a Type A proposition. He was not talking about “some” deductive arguments but “all” deductive arguments.
“What I think I’m saying is: if one takes a deductive argument, makes it certain, provides for a negated premise leading to a same true conclusion and provides for the preconditions of intelligibility then you’ve made the TAG.”
Bahnsen provides several reasons in his debate with Sproul for thinking that deductive arguments do not provide certainty. If you negate a premise of a “deductive” argument and still have the same conclusion then the argument is by definition no longer deductive. Arguing from a deductive syllogism by way of deductive inference to the existence of God takes logic to be primary and God derivative. If you can offer me a stated example of a deductive argument that provides certainty by getting around Bahnsen’s complaints, possesses the feature that a premise may be negated without changing the conclusion, and takes God to be logically primitive rather than derivative then you will certainly have my attention!
Until then I see no reason whether argumentatively in terms of formalization or textually in terms of Van Til and Bahnsen’s works to believe that TAG is a deductive argument. There is a mountain of unanswered evidence to the contrary.
In terms of your witness at work – I was going to mention this earlier but did not think it relevant enough at the time to do so – not everyone will agree with me but I view many of these discussions concerning the formal properties of TAG to not even be relevant when whatever version of TAG is applied to unbelief. While I would not agree with Mr. Di Giacomo’s formalization of TAG nor James Anderson’s, Paul Manata’s, Alvin Plantinga’s (yes, he has TA’s), Zao Thanatoo’s, John Frame’s, etc. one may find that on a pragmatic level what we actually do looks very much the same. I do not want you to think that as you study these matters for yourself that you no longer have reason yourself to believe or arguments to offer unbelievers. This is not to say that these matters are unimportant, but in the end presuppositionalists seem pretty intent upon presenting the Word of God as authoritative and effective in apologetic encounters and demonstrating that those who reject it saw off the branch of the tree they are standing upon. (When in doubt, use Van Tillian rhetoric.
)
For Collett’s formalization check out Oliphint’s “Revelation and Reason” or John Frame’s recently released festschrift. The concession/response from Frame you are referring to does give a quick sketch of what is going on. Mr. Di Giacomo has some problems with Collett’s formalization that are not necessarily unwarranted. My intent in citing Collett was merely to show one way in which a transcendental argument can be presented as distinct from a deductive argument. I am not overly confident that Bahnsen’s TAG is properly represented by what Collett has borrowed from Strawson. The issue has been on my radar screen for the very near future so hopefully I will have something up about it at some point.
“Prayer calendar at the session?” Regardless, thanks for everything.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 10. Apr, 2010, 1:21 amYou could not theoretically state that premise one of the argument is false by claiming that “TAG is a type of deductive argument that provides certainty” because “The first premise is supported by Greg Bahnsen’s claim and argument in his debate with R.C. Sproul that deductive arguments do not provide certainty.” Bahnsen was affirming a Type A proposition. He was not talking about “some” deductive arguments but “all” deductive arguments.
Yes Bahnsen seems to but we are talking about more than just Bahnsen here. First, what Bahnsen believes and secondly, what I believe. I’m saying that the way I understand my formulation of TAG is as a special kind of deductive argument.
Bahnsen provides several reasons in his debate with Sproul for thinking that deductive arguments do not provide certainty.
Is this debate available on the internet anywhere?
If you negate a premise of a “deductive” argument and still have the same conclusion then the argument is by definition no longer deductive.
The question is how you are negating the premise. If we negate the premise in the fashion that Collett does I see nothing other than a glaring logical fallacy. If we negate it in the fashion that Ron does we end up with two different, sound, deductive arguments. I’m going to read chapter 9 of VTA today and see which method Bahnsen uses and try to re-listen to the Stein debate and see what he does.
If you can offer me a stated example of a deductive argument that provides certainty by getting around Bahnsen’s complaints, possesses the feature that a premise may be negated without changing the conclusion, and takes God to be logically primitive rather than derivative then you will certainly have my attention!
I still wanna see a transcendental argument where a premise and a negated premise result in the same conclusion. For me, this:
1)Predication presupposes God
2)Predication
3)God
is really this:
1)True or false predication presupposes God
2)True or false predication
3)God
which is transcendental and is really just two different deductive arguments.
How do you go about it? It seems to be that you are saying something like this:
1)Causality presupposes God
2)Causality
3)God
and negating a premise:
1)Causality presupposes God
2)Not Causality
3)God
I don’t understand how that isn’t just a logical fallacy.
Arguing from a deductive syllogism by way of deductive inference to the existence of God takes logic to be primary and God derivative.
I’m not sure. I thought what we were essentially doing was arguing deductively that the precondition of deduction was God and therefore restoring Him to His rightful place in apologetics. Perhaps I’m wrong.
Regarding work, I think you are dead on there. The point is, ultimately, that Scripture is authoritative and any worldview that doesn’t accept that is finally absurd.
John Frame’s recently released festschrift.
Is that P&R publishing?
“Prayer calendar at the session?” Regardless, thanks for everything.
Yeah. My church has a prayer calendar that one can consult daily.
Posted by danielj | 10. Apr, 2010, 10:03 amBahnsen does not just *seem* to but rather Bahnsen *does* affirm a Type A proposition. The original discussion pertains to Van Til and Bahnsen’s understanding of TAG rather than your understanding of TAG. You should go ahead and concede that Bahnsen did not view TAG as deductive. I will return to your formalization of TAG as a “special kind of deductive argument” momentarily.
“If we negate the premise in the fashion that Collett does I see nothing other than a glaring logical fallacy.”
As of yesterday you did not know where to find Collett’s article. Have you since then found and read Collett’s article, or are you just going on what Ron is telling you? Scott Oliphint and John Frame certainly do not believe that Collett presents “a glaring logical fallacy” (they each provide updated versions of his article in their books and Frame concedes to Collett) so you should be hesitant to assume that Ron is right on this without even having read Collett’s article (if you have not). However, even if you reject Collett’s formalization it does not negate my arguments concerning Bahnsen’s understanding of TAG as being something other than a deductive argument. I do not attribute Collett’s argument to Bahnsen (even though Mr. Di Giacomo falsely accuses me of doing such after I explicitly stated that I do not do so). I plan to post on Collett in the future. Until then I am happy with setting Collett aside and sticking with what Bahnsen believed about TAG.
“If we negate it in the fashion that Ron does we end up with two different, sound, deductive arguments.”
You need to reread my responses as I already dealt with why Ron’s argument does not mesh with Bahnsen’s quote. One important reason that it does not do so is that Ron has not taken the first two lines of Bahnsen that I quoted into account in his explanation.
“I’m saying that the way I understand my formulation of TAG is as a special kind of deductive argument.”
Recall what I already wrote:
“If you can offer me a stated example of a deductive argument that provides certainty by getting around Bahnsen’s complaints, possesses the feature that a premise may be negated without changing the conclusion, and takes God to be logically primitive rather than derivative then you will certainly have my attention!”
You have not done this yet. You are offering straight deductive proof and arbitrarily calling it “special” but it does not match up with what either Van Til or Bahnsen wrote concerning TAG.
“The point is, ultimately, that Scripture is authoritative and any worldview that doesn’t accept that is finally absurd.”
Amen and I think from what I have seen that Mr. Di Giacomo would agree.
The Bahnsen/Sproul debate can be ordered online but does cost a few bucks. Frame’s festschrift is through P&R. Thanks for the actions with the prayer calendar and for clarifying that for me!
If you have other questions about resources shoot me an email at chrisbolt@ymail.com and I will try to provide you a more comprehensive and detailed list.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 10. Apr, 2010, 12:38 pmAs of yesterday you did not know where to find Collett’s article. Have you since then found and read Collett’s article, or are you just going on what Ron is telling you?
Ron has his formalization from the WTJ article in one of his posts. I’ve yet to see a copy of the original.
Scott Oliphint and John Frame certainly do not believe that Collett presents “a glaring logical fallacy”
If that is the case, then I think they are wrong too.
(they each provide updated versions of his article in their books and Frame concedes to Collett) so you should be hesitant to assume that Ron is right on this without even having read Collett’s article (if you have not).
I’m gonna have to wait a week to order the Frame feteschrift. I just ordered Calvin’s commentaries.
However, even if you reject Collett’s formalization it does not negate my arguments concerning Bahnsen’s understanding of TAG as being something other than a deductive argument.
I don’t think Bahnsen thought the argument was strictly deductive. I don’t see how you can make a proper argument that isn’t deductive in some way. If Bahnsen thought he had somehow risen above deduction entirely, I would think him foolish.
Please, show me your formalization of TAG or point me to a previous post where you have formalized it and explain to me how it doesn’t utilize deduction.
I plan to post on Collett in the future. Until then I am happy with setting Collett aside and sticking with what Bahnsen believed about TAG.
That is wise. I’m all right with that too.
You need to reread my responses as I already dealt with why Ron’s argument does not mesh with Bahnsen’s quote.
So, what are you suggesting Bahnsen means when he asks us to negate our initial fact or belief?
You have not done this yet.
So what is this:
1)If true or false predication then God
2)True and false predication
3)God
It looks to me like a Major and minor premise followed by a necessary conclusion. How is that different from deduction? Is it not transcendental?
The Bahnsen/Sproul debate can be ordered online but does cost a few bucks.
From where?
Blessings,
Daniel
Posted by danielj | 10. Apr, 2010, 2:27 pmfestschrift
Oops… I think the other word means something else entirely!
Posted by danielj | 10. Apr, 2010, 2:31 pmSunday is upon us! It may be a little longer before I am able to respond to you. I will try to email you some links to resources in the mean time.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 10. Apr, 2010, 5:11 pmTake your time. I’m in no rush.
Enjoy the Lord’s Day.
Posted by danielj | 10. Apr, 2010, 9:27 pmDaniel,
An argument is either deductive or not deductive. There is no in-between. So I do not know what you mean by “strictly deductive.” I am trying to get you to be clear on this. A deductive argument where the truth of some premise is informed by induction is still a deductive argument. For example:
All men are mortal.
Socrates was a man.
Therefore Socrates was mortal.
This is the classic example of a deductive argument yet both premises rely upon findings from induction. There is nothing unique about this example of a deductive argument as far as deductive arguments go. You offer the following as a transcendental argument:
1)If true or false predication then God
2)True and false predication
3)God
The second premise is false as it is a contradiction ~(Tp^~Tp). We can change it to “True or false predication.” So your argument now looks like this:
1)If true or false predication then God
2)True or false predication
3)God
We have a deductive argument. Now let us recall what Dr. Bahnsen wrote and put your deductive argument to the test to see whether or not it is a transcendental argument per Bahnsen. Bahnsen wrote, “Now then, if we should go back and negate the statement of that original belief (or consider a contrary experience), the transcendental analysis (if originally cogent or sound) would nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)
The statement of original belief in your proof is “True or false predication.” Bahnsen claims that we can “go back and negate the statement of that original belief.”
1)If true or false predication then God
2)Not True or false predication
3)God
The conclusion of the argument no longer follows. Yet Bahnsen writes that the argument should “nevertheless reach the very same conclusion.” Your argument does not. Therefore your argument does not constitute what Bahnsen would call a transcendental argument. We have illustrated just one way that Bahnsen thinks deductive arguments are different from transcendental arguments.
“To put it simply, in the case of ‘direct’ arguments (whether rational or empirical), the negation of one of their premises changes the truth or reliability of their conclusion. But this is not true of transcendental arguments, and that sets them off from the other kinds of proof or analysis. (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 501-502.)
You write, “I don’t see how you can make a proper argument that isn’t deductive in some way.” If by “proper” you mean “deductively valid” then you are merely stating a tautology such as, “I don’t see how you can make a [deductively valid] argument that isn’t deductive in some way.” If you are stating a tautology then you have much greater worries than trying to figure out TAG. If you are not stating a tautology then you need to ask yourself what you mean by “proper argument.” My thoughts are that you misspoke here. There are arguments that are not deductive. There are arguments that are not formal. So why are you requiring that TAG be a deductive argument in the first place?
No one in this discussion is saying to not use deduction, induction, or other non-formal argumentation. Bahnsen did not say it either, but Bahnsen did deny that TAG is a deductive argument and I agree with him. Bahnsen is not affirming a fallacy unless one assumes, *contrary to Bahnsen*, that he is using deduction. Again, reread my responses and see if you can figure out any other way to interpret the quotes I provided. I think I have made a pretty good case and so far have not heard any reason for thinking that I am wrong about this. People have accused me of sinning and people have blown me off but I have not seen a satisfying response yet. If I am wrong then help me out here. Be specific.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 11. Apr, 2010, 7:40 pmThe second premise is false as it is a contradiction
It is two different premises. I was unclear there.
I’ll get to the rest of this after work.
Posted by danielj | 12. Apr, 2010, 4:08 amAn argument is either deductive or not deductive. There is no in-between.
No one is postulating an “in-between.”
So I do not know what you mean by “strictly deductive.”
Sure you do. You postulate further down that some deductive arguments rely on induction proper for their premises. You’ve also brought up enthymemes which aren’t strictly deductive but deductive nonetheless.
1)If true or false predication, God
2)True predication
3)God
1)If true or false predication, God
2)False predication (negated premise)
3)God
Does this fit Bahnsen’s requirements for transcendental argumentation?
What about Ron’s argument here: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2010/04/bahnsen-misunderstood-servant-of-lord.html
My thoughts are that you misspoke here.
Your thoughts are wrong.
So why are you requiring that TAG be a deductive argument in the first place?
I require it to be transcendental. If it is deductive and so, then I’m happy. If you come up with a non-deductive version, I’m also happy.
Posted by danielj | 12. Apr, 2010, 7:52 pm“No one is postulating an ‘in-between.’”
So…is TAG as Bahnsen understood it deductive or not?
“You postulate further down that some deductive arguments rely on induction proper for their premises.”
Yes and I classified them as deductive arguments. There is nothing special about them and they are just as “strict” as any other deductive arguments. So I do not understand what you mean.
“You’ve also brought up enthymemes which aren’t strictly deductive but deductive nonetheless.”
Maybe if you quote one of these I can understand what you mean by an argument that is “deductive” but not “strictly deductive”. I really do not know what you mean.
“Does this fit Bahnsen’s requirements for transcendental argumentation?”
No because the second premise of the second syllogism has not been negated at all. “False predication” is *affirmed*.
“What about Ron’s argument here: http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com/2010/04/bahnsen-misunderstood-servant-of-lord.html”
I responded to it here – http://www.choosinghats.com/?p=1086 It does not take the Bahnsen quote into account. Check my other responses on that as well.
“Your thoughts are wrong.”
Well if you did not make a mistake there then could you tell me what you mean by “proper argument”? Or are you asserting a tautology? Those were the options.
“I require it to be transcendental. If it is deductive and so, then I’m happy.”
Am I mistaken in thinking that you have been arguing this entire time that TAG is deductive?
“If you come up with a non-deductive version, I’m also happy.”
Go check out Bahnsen’s.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 12. Apr, 2010, 9:31 pmHey brother, I may have given you a wrong link. There is this response also – http://www.choosinghats.com/?p=1073 but I do not have the time right now to track down which post goes with which.
As far as I know I will be away for a few days. God bless and keep studying.
Posted by C.L. Bolt | 13. Apr, 2010, 1:30 amNo because the second premise of the second syllogism has not been negated at all. “False predication” is *affirmed*.
What is not true predication?
Posted by danielj | 13. Apr, 2010, 5:15 am